Increased competition and conflict among users water rights are controlled and regulated. Humid of water have caused eastern states to investigate eastern states 3 evolved common law doctrines, while alternatives to their common law doctrines dealing the arid western ones adopted a prior-appropriation with water use, and the legislative trend is toward doctrine. In addition, several states chose to recognize greater state administration in water management. As both doctrines. 4 a part of this trend, Florida has enacted an adminThe physically abundant water supplies of the istrative water law (Florida Water Resource Act of eastern states led to a body of law which viewed 1972 [4] ) based upon a model water code suggested water as property-the property of no one to be for eastern states [11] . The economic efficiency shared by everyone. These are common law doctrines. implications of the allocation processes allowed by Rights to navigable waters were covered in the the code and the Florida act are examined herein to riparian doctrine. Owners of land adjoining a naviindicate how more effective use of basic economic gable lake or stream are entitled to the full natural principles could increase efficiency of water allocaflow. Others are entitled to use the waters for fishing tion under an administrative system. Since the and navigation. Taken literally, the doctrines preclude present body-of-water law has evolved over time and removing water from, or depositing any foreign any modifications must be consistent with this body substance into, the navigable water. The doctrine has of law,l eastern surface and groundwater law is been modified through case law over time, and reviewed first. Then, water allocation under adminpresently, the user may make "reasonable use" of the istrative water law, with a focus on the code and the water for any purpose not unduly interfering with Florida water act, is discussed. Alternative approaches "reasonable use" of other riparian land owners to water allocation which have potential for improv- [5, 12, 16] . ing economic efficiency are discussed last. 2 The groundwater law of the East also stems from common law doctrines. English common law considered groundwater below an individual's land to be EASTERN WATER LAW absolutely owned by him. The right to water was New statutes modify many aspects of existing water law and specific parts will be ultimately tested in the courts. It is not possible to foresee the outcome of these cases, but it is reasonable for economists to attempt to understand the evolved law and make suggestions that are not likely to conflict with this law. 2 The authors recognize that a substantial body of literature has been developed around the relationship between economics of water allocation and the western prior-appropriation doctrine. Eastern common law water doctrines stem from an entirely different legal basis and this relationship has not been developed.
3Eastern states are considered to be all states east of, and including, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana.
Federal government also had a large influence, through various actions, on water use. It is useful for purposes of this paper, however, to limit the discussion to state laws and their influence on water-use rights.
worked well when there was little use of the quantity and quality problems. The Florida act and groundwater [5, 12] .
the Model Water Code, both of which offer an As greater use (and the resulting competition) of administrative approach to water rights allocation and groundwater arose, two other doctrines evolved; regulation, are cases in point. 5 namely, the reasonable use and correlative rights doctrines. The reasonable use doctrine allows any reasonable use of groundwater on the land from ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION which it was removed. Water may not be taken and
The stated, legal intent of statutory regulation of used on lands other than that from which it was a state's water resources is to enhance public and pumped. The landowner was given a right to develop private water rights by considering hydrologic intergroundwater and land without regard to the external relationships of all types of water, minimizing uneffect that might be created [5, 12] . The correlative certainty (providing security), and providing flexirights doctrine requires landowners to apportion the bility that will allow maximum beneficial use of common groundwater supply. "Reasonableness," for water and eliminate waste [11] . The question that this case, is the balance of co-equal and co-extensive arises is: What are the implications for economic rights of affected landowners [5, 12] . efficiency and distribution under administrative reguConflicts between individuals over available lation with these objectives? The administrative strucsupplies of both surface and groundwater are settled ture outlined in the code and implemented in the by civil litigation under the common law doctrine.
Florida administrative system will serve as an example With ample supplies and low usage of water ( five water management disctricts (hereinafter referred As populations grew and society become more to as the districts), established along hydrologic lines. complex, criticism was leveled at the common law Stated intent of the act is to provide for management doctrines because they often indirectly prevented of water for efficient use and conservation, as well as more efficient use of a state's water resources.
for protection of natural resources, fish and wildlife, Economic efficiency is not necessarily considered in and public health and welfare [4] . common law, since almost all uses are considered
The heart of the water regulation process is a equally valuable. This problem is compounded bepermit system administered by the districts. There are cause the doctrines do not provide for use of water two types of permits, regulatory and consumptive on lands other than from which it originated. A great use. Regulatory permits provide control over physical deal of uncertainty is created for the user as the modifications of the water resource system [4, Parts concept of reasonableness changes over time in III and IV] . A permit of the consumptive use type response to case law. Indeed, extent of a landowner's must be obtained for removal of water from all right of reasonable use can be determined only by sources for all uses except domestic consumption by expensive litigation, often of long duration, and then individuals. Permits may be granted for up to twenty only with respect to the other litigant. Growing years [4, Part II] , but at present are being given for concern over adequacy of the common law case-byshorter periods. For a permit to be granted, it must case approach has led many states to move toward be established that the proposed use is a "reasonableconsidering statutory means for dealing with water beneficial use," 7 will not interfere with any presently existing legal use (a permitted use), and is consistent transfer occurs [16, p. 18] . Under this system, shifts with the "public interest" [4, Part II, Sec. 3 (1)]. In from "old" to "new" uses can occur only when the fact, the act generally emphasizes what it terms permit terminates. As a result, as soon as physical public interest considerations. For example, in the supplies are all allocated (all rights assigned), ecocase of water shortages (insufficient water to meet nomic activities having higher valued uses (if any permitted quantities, or conditions being such that exist) will be excluded. water use should be reduced to protect water
The act also provides little information on how resources from "serious harm"), the Board may water is to be divided in a water shortage or impose restrictions in light of the "public interest" emergency. A water shortage plan is to be developed [4, Part II, Sec. 10 (3)]. As such, the legislation by each district [4] ; the plan is to include classificaappears to have greatly enhanced public rights in tion of permits according to source, method and use. determining water allocations [10] . The question is:
In periods of water shortage, the Board may order How will private rights fair under the act? The act is temporary reduction in total water use, impose not specific as to private rights. 8 The districts have, restrictions on one or more classes of permits, make however, developed criteria for giving permits to changes in conditions of an individual's permit, place private users.
restrictions on his use of water or suspend his permit Generally speaking, the water permitting-[4, Part II, Sec. 10 (6)]. And, in the case of an allocation procedure is currently based on techemergency they may apportion, rotate, limit or nical criteria. The recognized "entitlement" to prohibit the use of the district's water resources [4, water is related to the long-run availability of Part II, Sec. 10 (7)]. water from the specific source (the physical There is, then, a great deal of uncertainty supply), as compared to the amount of water associated with an individual's right to water. "required" by the proposed "reasonable" use. The
Whether his right will be enhanced or diminished following example, representative of the approach will depend upon administrative discretion. This for an agricultural use permit, will serve to clarify, has caused Trelease [15] to conclude that the A producer applies for a groundwater permit code has substituted administrative uncertainty for to irrigate a 160-acre citrus grove. The district the legal uncertainties of common law doctrines. His determines maximum evapotranspiration requirecomment is also apropos to the Florida Water Act. ment for the crop (i.e., the optimum, maximum plant growth water requirement). His "entitlement" becomes either (1) the quantity of water annually recharged to the aquifer from all his ALTERNATIVE WATER ALLOCATION owned land (which may be more than 160 acres), APPROACHES or (2) the quantity of water required to make up Water, as a source of service flows to private uses, the difference between evapotranspiration and does not lend itself readily to open market allocation, average precipitation. The producer is given a perbecause (in part) of the substantial public service mit for the smaller of these two quantities, as flows it also provides. In fact, under the common law long as he does not significantly affect surrounding doctrines, many of these public uses precede the users of water with his pumping (externalities are rights of private users. While the Florida administrabanned). Obviously, there are no economic tive system places public interest foremost, it uses a efficiency principles being utilized in this technical technical, and potentially inefficient (economically), criterion. 9 water right allocation approach. However, there are The act is also unclear with regard to how use is ways to modify eastern water law to improve to be shifted from "old" to "new." Current practice allocative efficiency. by the districts ties the water right to land ownership Assume the administrative authority, through for a certain period of time (up to 20 years), or until some type of broad benefit-cost calculus, has estabthe land is transferred to another owner, whichever is lished that a given, fixed flow of water in a watershed shorter. The right is extinguished if an attempted or groundwater basin shall be allocated in a certain manner such as to satisfy public interest.'
The Trelease [15] has suggested that eastern states question faced by the authority is how to efficiently use the administrative structure presented in the code and practically allocate remaining water rights among in conjunction with the appropriation doctrine used private users. Harl [5] and Trelease [15] have in western states. He points out that the administraaddressed this question. Their viewpoints representing tive structure in the code will adequately protect the basic approaches typically suggested by economists resource, the environment and public interest. His and lawyers are discussed below, along with a third criticism deals with provisions for private rights to approach we feel has merit, water. Essentially, he is arguing for greater security Harl [5] has recommended an approach for and flexibility in private rights to water, which he Iowa, which has a permit system [7] similar to the believes the appropriation doctrine 1 provides. one suggested in the code. Iowa's permit system does There are, however, several aspects of the not allow free transfer of permits and thus precludes appropriative doctrine which can be viewed as objecallocation of water rights in a market. Harl noted that tionable. First, if water is interpreted to be public optimal allocation of a fixed supply among indeproperty, there is an obvious windfall gain to the pendent productive uses occurs at the point where superior appropriators when a right-to-water is value of the marginal product of water in all uses is granted in perpetuity [11] . As demonstrated in the equal [5, p. 32a] . He suggested a system of ad citrus grove example, this windfall gain can be quite valorem taxation could have an allocative effect large. The situation is further aggravated if it is similar to a market system. necessary for the administrative agency to recover The authors find Harl's recommendations a step water rights to protect the public's interest; they in the right direction, but have reservations about must purchase back the rights to water which were their applicability in a rapidly changing state (like granted initially for no charge. Second, groundwater Florida). The approach of allocating permits at the has also given the western states problems [9] , and is value of the marginal product, for example, does not likely to do so in the East. The question is: Who is deal with the problem of time dynamics of water appropriating what water? There is no clearly defined allocation. Even if this rule is used to give out initial flow of groundwater as there is with streams; groundpermits, the resulting resource allocation would be water is diffused and availability can change with optimal over the life of the permit only if there is pumping patterns. Many western states have statuvery little change in production systems and in torily modified these groundwater doctrines to procommunities' water use. In a growth situation, the tect public interest [9, 14] . Other authors [2, 6] burden is placed on the water authority to project have pointed out economic shortcomings of the growth in water use and to establish the value in allocation systems used in appropriation doctrine various uses over time. This "solution by directive" states and California. [3] would be extremely costly, even if value in use
As an alternative, the authors feel some features remained constant over time. Costs of discovering all of a competitive market can and should be adopted in such use functions (especially if they change over order to solve the water allocation problem over time time) are exorbitant. Costs of such knowledge could and space. 2 A "pseudo-market" could be developed exceed the benefits gained in economic efficiency.
with the administrative authority serving as a clearing 1The authors do not wish to relegate the decision that must be made regarding the choice between private and public interest to the unworthy position of noneconomic importance; i.e., economic principles could (and should) also be applied in allocation decisions between public and private uses and within (and among) public uses. We are also practical, however: public interest, in many cases, involves dealing with the Samuelson type of "public good," problems of measurability, and, certainly, involves the consideration of a multiple objective function. We see some currently insurmountable problems in allocating the water rights needed to satisfy public interest in a market system. At best, transactions costs would only be higher. At worst, a market could not and would not operate at all. This is not to say that economic principles should not be used in the public sector. We simply see less hope for establishing a market, clearing house operation. Therefore, at least as a starting point, it seems public interest should be satisfied through a somewhat arbitrary (but based on "educated guesses" and contingencies) decision process regarding the water "needed."
11The prior appropriation doctrine, as used in western states, has evolved with state administration to keep the private rights to water orderly. Essentially, the doctrine (1) gives exclusive right to the first appropriator, and rights of later appropriators are conditional upon these prior rights; (2) makes all rights conditional upon beneficial use; (3) permits water to be used on nonriparian lands as well as on riparian lands; (4) permits diversion of water regardless of the diminution of the stream; and (5) allows loss of the right due to nonuse [8] .
12Bain, et al. [2, p. 666] have recognized the need for marketable water rights in California. They state, "Throughout our study, we have noted that a striking attribute of the California water industry is its consistent failure to develop continuous markets for water and water rights. And this failure, we have stressed, is in a significant part responsible for failure of agencies in the industry to correct historical misallocations of water among uses, users, and sites of use or to reallocate water when changing economic conditions made such reallocation desirable." house or "arena" within which the market could year thereafter, Nc certificates would expire and Nc operate. The administrative authority would allow for certificates could be sold-the latter having an effecsale of transferable "water certificates," where each tive life of t years. Each certificate would provide an represented an entitlement to a water flow that could entitlement to a flow of water, Xa, in normal be pumped from a particular sub-region of a district.
hydrologic periods. In periods of water supply shortEach certificate would give property right to water ages, the entitlement Xa would be reduced in for some particular period of time. During the time proportion to the reduction in overall supply, Xt. period, certificates would be transferable between During the life of these certificates, individuals water users under supervision of the water authority.
could buy and/or lease certificates from other indiAt the end of the period, the certificates would revert viduals at any price they could negotiate. 1 4 Water to the water authority and could be offered for sale users would deal with water in much the same way again.
they deal with other factors of production. This More specifically, the pseudo-market system would increase water use efficiency among uses and could operate in the following way. The authority users. Also, requiring Nc permits to expire each year would issue certificates (on a bid basis) the first year, gives flexibility to the administrative authority. In having varying time periods, with a maximum of t any particular year, it could choose, for example, to years (and others with lesser periods). All rights to retain Nr certificates in a particular area for "public water available for private use in a particular area (Xt, interest" or some other use. The maximum number the total supply) would be offered for sale. 3 To of certificates that would be circulating in the start the process, t different types of permits would "market" at any point in time would be Nt. The be issued, each having a different time duration authority could cause the number to be reduced to (measured in years) specified by t-1, t-2, ..., 1. The (Nt-Nr) in any one year, by not reissuing Nr proportion to be issued for each time duration should certificates, or by buying certificates in the "market." be 1/t. The actual amount of water represented by a
The authority could protect "public interest," then, certificate would be some common, known measure by being an active participant in the market as well as Xa. The total number of permits available the first by retaining Nr certificates in any given year. year is given by:
Revenues from the sale of certificates could provide funding for normal water management funcXt tions. Presently, these funds usually come from Nt= Xa general revenues. The water authority could also use revenues to enhance the value of water certificates by where reducing hydrologic uncertainty (e.g., by stabilizing supplies through construction of water conservation Nt = number of permits available for sale facilities and/or transfer of water from water-rich Xt = total available supply of water basins to water-deficient areas).' 5 Xa = quantity of water represented in a particular There are, of course, many problems that would permit.
have to be resolved in implementing the proposed system. Selecting the time duration, t, for certificates The number of certificates in each time duration class is of particular interest. Optimum life for certificates (Nc) is represented by:
will depend on types of use and capital investment problems associated with these uses. Defining avail-1 able supply, Xt, in a particular area is also a difficult c t problem, but one with which all allocative systems must deal. There is, also, the problem of individuals That is, the authority could sell Nc certificates in attempting to control large quantities of certificates each of the time duration classes the first year. Every and manipulate the market price of certificates to 13 The problem of determining Xt is not a simple one. Because of the large number of nonmoney valued benefits (and costs)
flowing from the water resource, it seems a realistic starting point would be to define Xt as the total quantity of water available for use to the private sector; i.e., Xt is the water supply remaining after the many "public uses" (like minimum stream flows, pollution abatement, salt water intrusion prevention, wildlife preservation, etc.) are subtracted from the total quantity available (see footnote 10). 1 4 Administratively controlled irrigation water rental markets similar to this exist in some western states using the appropriation doctrine and are described in Anderson [1] . 1 5It should be noted, however, that the act allows water to be used on land other than riparian or overlying land, as long as the physical transfer is in the "public interest." their advantage. This could possibly be minimized by greater administrative control. requiring the water authority to monitor certificate In the past, economic principles have played transfer. The authors feel, however, gains in economic almost no role in water allocation in the East. 6 efficiency should exceed costs. Enforcement costs Economic principles can, however, be used in alloca-(ensuring holders of certificates do not withdraw ting water, at least among some uses. The authors more water than the purchased entitlement) may be believe, especially, that economic principles can be high; however, these costs would also exist for the incorporated into water allocation among private current Florida (technical) allocation system as well uses, thereby improving economic efficiency, and still as for the Harl and Trelease approaches. Further be compatible with the broader "public interest." research needs to be undertaken to determine costs
The authors further believe economists cannot stand and, in general, to better evaluate the proposal.
by while allocative institutions are restructured; technical criteria "or water allocation are not suf-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIOS ficient for the task. Economists must put forward Change is likely to occur in the water allocative practical approaches and make decision bodies aware systems of most eastern states. In the past, little of possibilities for improving the water allocation conflict arose among water users, as water was not a process. Of the three allocative approaches discussed, scarce resource. Presently, uses and users of water are it is not clear which is economically superior. Each many (public and private), and competition for the has its conceptual strengths and weaknesses. Empirisupplies is increasing. States are looking to statutory cal research over time will help identify the best modification of their water institutions to resolve the system. The approach recommended by the authors is conflict among uses and users. The trend is toward but one step toward a practical approach.
